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CREATING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
ABUSIVE ANIMAL RESEARCH
KAREN L. McDONALDt
Animals have been the subject of scientific research and experi-
mentation since the third century B.C.1 Although painful experiments
are no longer justified by resorting to the Cartesian view that animals
are simply machines,2 research on animals continues in the hope of
discovering answers to medical and biological questions. With the de-
velopment of an active movement for the recognition of animal rights,
however, both the use of animals in research and the pain that is in-
flicted on them in the name of science are coming under increasing
scrutiny.'
Scientists have exercised almost exclusive control over the use of
animals to further scientific knowledge. As a number of commentators
have shown, however, the scientific community often fails to account
adequately for animals' interests in research projects.4 Examples of
questionable research include the mutilation of cats to observe the ef-
fects of physical changes on their sex lives,5 subjecting baboons to simu-
lated car accidents to test the safety of automobiles,' and administering
doses of radiation to monkeys to test the effect on their ability to turn a
wheel.
7
t B.A. 1981, Trinity College (Hartford, Connecticut); J.D. Candidate 1986, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
I See A. ROWAN, OF MICE, MODELS, AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF
ANIMAL RESEARCH 42 (1984).
2 See Descartes, Animals Are Machines, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLI-
GATIONS 60 (1976).
' See Robbins, Animal Rights: A Growing Movement in U.S., N.Y. Times, June
15, 1984, at Al, col. 3. For a discussion of the philosophical basis for granting animals'
rights, see generally T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); P. SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975). These two books offer utilitarian and neo-Kantian argu-
ments for the recognition of rights of animals.
" See, e.g., A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 167-76; P. SINGER, supra note 3, at 28-
80.
, See Singer, Ten Years of Animal Liberation, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 17, 1985,
at 46-47.
e See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 168-69.
7 See Singer, supra note 5, at 48.
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It is open to debate when, and if, research on animals is justified
as a means of acquiring medical knowledge to benefit humans. At the
same time, it is clear that the level of pain that animals are frequently
subjected to and the trivial nature of some of the experiments are unac-
ceptable. Animals must be provided with more respect than they are
currently receiving inside research facilities.
In a system in which animals do not have legal rights,' the ques-
tion of how to ensure adequate protection of animal interests in the
laboratory is problematic. One possible answer is to promote legislation
at the state level that will recognize animals as having certain legal
rights.9 This solution provides an answer to the inadequacies of current
state anticruelty laws.10 Another possibility is to turn to the federal gov-
ernment for improved regulations on the use of laboratory animals.11
These approaches, however, share a c6mmon difficulty: the need to
wait for legislative action before animals can be protected. In light of
the current abuses, it is necessary to examine possible means by which
animals can be afforded some protection under existing law.
This Comment proposes that animal rights groups be given a
cause of action against unjustifiable research 2 under state anticruelty
laws. Part I argues that current federal regulations, which place exclu-
sive control over research in the hands of scientists, provide inadequate
protection for animals and that state law can be used to enforce hu-
mane standards of care. Part II proposes a public nuisance action as a
means of obtaining injunctive relief against experiments that violate
state anticruelty laws. Part III discusses granting standing to societies
for the prevention of cruelty to animals (SPCA's) and other animal
rights groups in public nuisance actions as a response to the lack of
enforcement of anticruelty statutes by public authorities. Part III con-
cludes that these groups should have standing in light of the liberal
approach that state courts have taken towards standing in other areas
s See Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 147, 151 (1978).
' See Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 205, 231-44
(1975) (proposing a model act to regulate the use of animals in research); Comment,
Rights for Non-Human Animals: A Guardianship Model for Dogs and Cats, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 484, 491-506 (1977) (proposing that legislatures provide for the possi-
bility of legal guardians for animals).
10 See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
"I See Comment, Use of Animals in Medical Research: The Need for Governmen-
tal Regulation, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1733, 1749-51 (1978).
12 The exact line that should be drawn as to what constitutes unjustifiable re-
search is not addressed in this Comment. The purpose of this Comment is to suggest a
cause of action that would enable societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals and
animal rights groups to litigate the scientific and moral issues surrounding animal ex-
perimentation. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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of the law. Although there are many problems with applying the noto-
riously weak anticruelty statutes to laboratory research, it is hoped that
this approach will put an end to the most egregious cases of animal
abuse and will spur legislatures and the scientific community into mak-
ing real changes in the treatment of laboratory animals.
I. APPLYING ANTICRUELTY STATUTES TO
LABORATORY RESEARCH
The use of animals in laboratory research has become an issue of
broad public debate. The recent outcry over the Department of De-
fense's plan to shoot dogs in order to train doctors in treating combat
injuries illustrates that the concern over animal rights is no longer con-
fined to a small group of animal rights advocates."3 Public exposure of
the nature of some of the experiments-the sex manipulation research
on cats 4 and the baboon car crash tests, 5 for example-is resulting in
both a marked increase in the membership of animal rights groups and
a growing sentiment that public control should be exerted over the
work performed in the laboratory."6 The position that "almost any cru-
elty [is] tolerated in American laboratories if it [is] perpetrated by a
man in a white lab-coat with letters after his name"' 7 is no longer
widely accepted. The American public's faith in scientists has been
shaken by the dissatisfaction many feel towards the balance science has
struck between animal and human interests.
The imposition of public control over laboratory research has
raised concerns on the part of the scientific community about intrusions
into academic and scientific freedom. In the recent prosecution of Dr.
Edward Taub for violations of Maryland's anticruelty laws,"' his sup-
" See Weinberger Halts School's Plan to Shoot Dogs, Washington Post, July 27,
1983, at Cl, col. 2 (discussing the outcry from Congress and animal welfare advocates
over military plans to shoot dogs for medical research); see also P. SINGER, supra note
3, at 28 (The Department of Defense received more letters protesting the use of beagles
for poisonous gas tests than for any other event.).
14 In the 1970's the Museum of Natural History conducted research on the effects
of certain physical mutilations-including "destruction of sense of smell, removal of
parts of the brain, castration, and severing the nerves to the penis"-on the sex lives of
cats. See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 165. A public campaign against these experi-
ments succeeded in terminating this research project in 1977 in favor of one in which
animal behavior was studied in more natural settings. See id.
13 See id. at 168-69.
18 See Robbins, supra note 3, at Al, A14.
17 C. NIVEN, HISTORY OF THE HUMANE MOVEMENT 129 (1967). In Niven's
view, a major reason for the failure to date of the antivivisectionist movement is the
high esteem in which the public holds scientists. See id. at 128-29.
18 Dr. Edward Taub was charged with 17 counts of violating anticruelty statutes
and was convicted on one. See Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 441, 463 A.2d 819, 820
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porters argued that application of these statutes to laboratory research
threatened scientific freedom.1 9 This challenge to public control as a
threat to the autonomy of the scientist has been largely successful in
Congress. As the Senate Report to the Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act20 noted, "[Tihe committee was very careful to provide protection
for the researcher . . . by exempting from regulation all animals dur-
ing actual research or experimentation."21
To argue that the imposition of public controls would violate sci-
entific freedom ignores the fact that scientists' freedom is already cur-
tailed by the need to file for grants and receive funding from outside
sources. As one commentator has noted, "Funding agencies provide
support for their research missions, not the whims and fancies of the
researcher scientist."22 The separation between the scientific commu-
nity and the rest of the public is equally unsound. In this age of mas-
sive federal funding of research, 23 it is unrealistic to think of science as
operating outside the public domain. With the heavy involvement of the
government, and hence, the public, in current research, the issue be-
comes "not whether to impose social control, but how to do so. ' '24
A. The Inadequacy of Federal Regulations
The Animal Welfare Act of 197025 (the Act) is the heart of federal
regulation over the use of animals by research laboratories." Licensing
(1983). This conviction was overturned on the grounds that the statute did not apply to
federally funded research. See id. at 444-45, 463 A.2d at 822; see also text accompany-
ing notes 48-55 (discussing Taub).
'9 See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 175.
o S. REP. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2635.
21 Id. at 56, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2637.
22 A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 275.
23 The federal government's support of research involving laboratory animals was
estimated to be over $1.5 billion in 1972. See Regan, Introduction to ANIMAL RIGHTS
AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 3 (1976).
24 Goldberg, Controlling Basic Science: The Case of Nuclear Fusion, 68 GEO.
L.J. 683, 684 (1980). This Comment assumes that it is constitutionally permissible for
the state to regulate the methods chosen by scientists for research. For discussions of the
first amendment implications of governmental regulation of science, see, for example,
Delgado, Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Re-
strictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128 (1983); Ferguson, Scientific
Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979); Robertson, The
Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203
(1978).(7 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1982).
2 The first federal legislation dealing with the regulation of the use of animals by
research laboratories was the Act of Aug. 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1982)). The 1966 Act arose out of a
storm of public protest caused by a Life magazine story detailing the abuse of animals
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and recordkeeping requirements are imposed on animal dealers, carri-
ers, and research facilities to prevent the theft of animals for sale to
laboratories.27 All warmblooded animals designated by the Department
of Agriculture are subject to regulations governing their care during
transportation.28 The Act, however, is far too limited to provide real
protection for laboratory animals.
Although the House Report to the Act included the statement that
"animals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of adequate
housing, ample food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation,
sufficient ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and tempera-
ture, and adequate veterinary care including the appropriate use of
pain killing drugs,"29 Congress refused to place any restrictions on the
actual research performed by scientists. The Act explicitly states that
the Secretary of Agriculture is not authorized to regulate the actual
research "as determined by such research facility." 30 Congress has cho-
sen to leave it up to the scientific community to ensure that research is
performed with "compassion and with care," 1 refusing to legislate any
duties on the researchers beyond the filing of annual reports to show
that their care and use of animals meets professionally acceptable
standards.2
Congress's expectation that animals will be treated with compas-
sion and care has not been fulfilled. After reviewing current practices,
one commentator concluded that "a careful and detailed reading of the
research literature . . . reveals far too many cases where a little more
thought would have resulted in a lot less animal suffering."33 In one
experiment, for example, four monkeys were placed in restraining
chairs, and steady force was applied to their facial bones for 84 to 205
by dealers. See Stevens, Laboratory Animal Welfare, in ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL
RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641 TO 1978, at 46 (3d ed. 1978).
The Act provided protection only for certain animals-dogs, cats, monkeys, guinea
pigs, hamsters, and rabbits. See Act of Aug. 24, 1966, § 2(h), 80 Stat. at 351. For a
detailed history of the 1966 Act, see Stevens, supra, at 46-49.
27 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2133, 2140 (1982).
28 See 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (1982).
29 H. REP. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5103, 5104.
30 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982). Bills are now before the House of Representatives
and the Senate that would require the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the
Director of the National Institutes of Health, to establish guidelines for the care and
treatment of animals during the actual research process. See H.R. 2409, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 493(a) (1985); S. 1309, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 493(a) (1985).
Si H. REP. No. 1651, supra note 29, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5104.
2 See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982).
33 A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 173.
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days to study the possibility of treating human skeletal deformations.3 4
The result of the experiment: two monkeys died, all suffered severe
inflammations, and the researchers concluded that in light of current
technology, "the clinical application of the present investigation is ques-
tionable." 5 In head injury tests at the University of Pennsylvania, pre-
cise amounts of pressure were applied to monkeys' heads with a pneu-
matic hammer-like mechanism. Helmets that had been placed on the
monkeys' heads were then removed by the researchers with hammers
and chisels, thus raising serious doubts about the validity of the re-
searchers' findings as well as concerns about the level of pain to which
the monkeys were subjected.3" The failure of the Animal Welfare Act
to fulfill its goal of ensuring that "animals intended for use in research
facilities . . . are provided humane care and treatment,"' 7 can be
ascribed to two basic problems: the level of discretion that the scientist
retains under the Act, and the lack of enforcement of the provisions that
are in place.
By allowing scientists much, if not total, discretion in the design
and implementation of experiments, the Act has failed to counteract
pressures that lead to the abuse of animals in the laboratory. Scientists
are not cruel people. Their education, however, has taught many of
them to view animals as "mere tools" to be used to further their profes-
sional and altruistic goals. 8 These other interests tend to prevail over
concerns about the interests of animals. Moreover, as one physician
stated, "some scientific problems are not really worth solving."39 Per-
sons intimately involved in the pursuit of knowledge may at times lose
sight of what is truly necessary to learn.
The second problem with the Animal Welfare Act is the reluc-
tance of the Department of Agriculture to enforce the existing provi-
sions." In the first decade of federal regulation in this area, only two
34 Id. at 167-68.
35 Id. at 168.
31 See Pothier, Penn Will Discuss Its Animal Research, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Dec. 19, 1984, at 3-B, col. 1.
37 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982).
38 See P. SINGER, supra note 3, at 46-48.
" Goldman, Controversial Aspects of Current Animal Experimentation, in
ANIMAL RIGHTS-A SYMPOSIUM 192 (1979).
40 The Department of Agriculture has never been an enthusiastic supporter of the
legislation. In 1966 it expressed concern over the inclusion of research facilities in the
requirements of the Act of Aug. 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1982)). See S. REP. No. 1281, supra note 20, at
10-12, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2643 (letter from Secre-
tary of Agriculture to Chairman of Commerce Committee (Mar. 25, 1966)). During
the debate over the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560
(1970), the Department advocated giving responsibility for enforcement to the Depart-
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persons were prosecuted.4" The annual reporting requirement has not
spurred the Department into taking action in questionable cases. De-
spite the refusal of the campus veterinarian at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley to sign the annual reports, and repeated criticism of
the facilities by federal investigators, no action was taken against the
University until a local television station ran an expos6 on the condi-
tions of the animal facilities.42 The performance of the agency charged
with the enforcement of the Act demonstrates the difficulty of protect-
ing laboratory animals through existing legislation.
The National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) has attempted to exert
some control over the treatment of animals in federally funded research
through the adoption of a Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals43 and by requiring that annual assurances of adequate treat-
ment of animals be filed with the N.I.H.'s Office for Protection from
Research Risks.44 Despite the optimism of some,4 there does not ap-
pear to be any reason to expect that these reports will be more effective
than the Animal Welfare Act's reporting requirement-especially since
the N.I.H. was a vocal opponent of federal regulation when it was first
proposed.4" Moreover, the essential element of the agency's review pro-
ment of Health, Education & Welfare. See H. REP. No. 1651, supra note 29, at 3,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5105 (letter from Undersecretary
of Agriculture to Chairman of Committee on Agriculture (June 9, 1970)). In 1976 the
Department opposed amendments to the Animal Welfare Act in favor of unspecified
alternative measures. See H. REP. No. 801, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 758, 766-67 (letter from Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture to Chairman of Committee on Agriculture (Sept. 25, 1975)).
The Department's opposition to improved regulations has continued. During the
98th Congress the Department's representative testified against a bill that would have
required the Secretary to develop standards of care for laboratory animals, claiming
that "the bill would create unnecessary oversight procedures." Improved Standards for
Laboratory Animals: Hearing on S. 657 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (statement of Bert Hawkins,
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agricul-
ture) [hereinafter cited as Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals].
41 See Rikleen, The Animal Welfare Act: Still a Cruelty to Animals, 7 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129, 137-38 (1978).
42 See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 174-75.
43 COMMITTEE ON CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS, INSTITUTE OF
LABORATORY ANIMAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, GUIDE FOR
THE CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS (rev. ed. 1978).
" See 41 C.F.R. § 3-4.5802 (1984).
" Thomas Malone, of the Office of the Director of the N.I.H., has suggested that
the written assurances provide protection for laboratory animals because they must be
acceptable in order for the scientist to receive funding. See Malone, Toward Refine-
ment, Replacement and Reduction in the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, in
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMAL WELFARE 12-13 (1982).
4 See Stevens, supra note 26, at 47-48. One of the reasons why the Department
of Agriculture rather than the N.I.H. was charged with enforcement was the N.I.H.'s
opposition to any regulation. See id. at 48-49. This distrust of the N.I.H. appears to be
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cess is the "peer review system."'47 Peer review, however, has not pro-
vided effective protection of animal interests.
The case of Taub v. State4 illustrates the ineffectiveness of a peer
review system. Dr. Taub was charged with seventeen counts of violat-
ing Maryland's anticruelty statutes and was convicted on one.49 Al-
though Taub's conviction was overturned by the Maryland Court of
Appeals on the grounds that the anticruelty statute did not apply to
federally funded research projects,50 the care accorded monkeys in his
research project raises serious questions about the adequacy of the peer
review process. In one of his grant applications, Taub proposed to
spend fifty-five cents per day on maintenance for each monkey, whereas
the national average for care for normal monkeys was $2.50 to $4.00
per day."1 When the police went into his laboratory, they discovered
monkeys with open wounds from self-amputation52 and a disturbing
lack of hygiene, including cages "caked with feces."5" Further investi-
gation uncovered substantial evidence of a lack of veterinary care for
Taub's monkeys.54 The animal care committee at Taub's laboratory,
failed to act on this deplorable level of care. Indeed, one member of the
committee is said to have assumed that the treatment of the monkeys
was satisfactory simply because the laboratory had been inspected by
the Department of Agriculture and the project was funded by the
N.I.H. 55
Another showing of the failure of peer review involves the N.I.H.-
funded head injury tests at the University of Pennsylvania. These tests
were funded by the N.I.H. for thirteen years.5" After animal rights
activists stole and released tapes of the experiments, public outcry led to
lessening. Two bills before Congress give the N.I.H. the responsibility for developing
guidelines for the care of animals and require that violations be reported to the N.I.H.
See H.R. 2409, supra note 30, at § 493; S. 1309, supra note 30, at § 493.
" See The Use of Animals in Medical Research and Testing: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1981) (statement of Dr. William Raub, Associate
Director for Extramural Research and Training, National Institutes of Health) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on Medical Research].
48 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
o" See id. at 441, 463 A.2d at 820.
50 See id. at 444-45, 463 A.2d at 822.
51 See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 176.
52 See White, Police Raid Lab, Seize Animals, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1981,
at Al, col. 2.
53 Singer, Ten Years of Animal Liberation, supra note 5, at 47.
5 See A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 62.
5 See Hearings on Medical Research, supra note 47, at 43 (statement of Alex
Pacheco, Chairperson, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals).
8 See Heidorn, Penn Halts Injury Tests on Animals: "Serious Concerns"
Prompted Decision, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1985, at 1-B, col. 1.
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investigations by both the N.I.H. and the University.5 Four different
academic groups approved of the research and methodology. 8 Contin-
ued investigation by the Department of Health and Human Services,
however, led the Department to order the N.I.H. to suspend federal
funding because "serious concerns [had] been raised about the proce-
dures."59 The reluctance of the scientific community to condemn these
experiments reinforces the view that peer review cannot adequately
protect animals.
That the peer review process is unsatisfactory should come as no
surprise. When individuals in research institutions criticize the treat-
ment of animals, the response tends to be an attack on the person
rather than an investigation of the criticism. 0 Although one can hope
that these institutions will become more responsive to internal criti-
cisms, there is a deeper reason to be skeptical of the adequacy of peer
review. The process of peer review "reflects rather than challenges the
status quo." '61 Since it is the status quo that must be challenged, it is
doubtful that peer review can serve to improve the level of care that
animals are currently receiving.
One solution may be to copy Sweden's example and include lay
persons on oversight committees to monitor the treatment of laboratory
animals.6 2 Review at the institutional level by such committees may
well be the ideal approach to the problem of ensuring adequate repre-
sentation of animal interests.63 The inclusion of lay persons on animal
" See Pothier, Animal-Research Aid Cut Off at Penn, Philadelphia Inquirer,
July 19, 1985, at 1-A, col. 1.
" See id.
59 Id.
60 For examples of the response of research institutions to internal criticisms, see
A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 36-38. As Andrew Rowan reports, although questions are
raised in the scientific community from time to time, laboratories tend to stifle criti-
cisms. Responses have included attempts to discredit the critic's work, as well as forced
resignations. See id.
61 Id. at 279.
62 In Sweden a scientist must receive the approval of an oversight committee con-
sisting of a scientist, a technician, and a layperson before beginning an experiment on
animals. See Obrink, Swedish Law on Laboratory Animals, in SCIENTIFIC PERSPEC-
TIVES ON ANIMAL WELFARE 56 (W. Dodds & F. Orlans eds. 1982). If the proposed
experiment does not adequately account for the animals' interests, the committee works
with the scientist to develop an alternate experimental method. Further, the local health
authorities receive reports on each experiment. See id. at 56-58.
63 The composition of such committees has provoked some debate among persons
concerned with protecting the interests of laboratory animals. Andrew Rowan has sug-
gested that each committee should include "at least one member who is specifically
charged with looking after the interests of the animals." A. ROWAN, supra note 1, at
280. Another noted animal rights advocate, Peter Singer, has responded to this sugges-
tion by proposing that "[iut would be more appropriate to have a balance between those
representing the interests of the animals, and those representing the researchers, with
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care committees, however, is not the norm in this country. 4
By leaving the research process to the sole discretion of scientists,
the federal regulations have failed to provide adequate protection for
laboratory animals. Examples of unacceptable treatment of animals and
questionable experiments65 illustrate that the current regulatory scheme
offers inadequate assurances that the interests of laboratory animals
will be respected. That the N.I.H. eventually suspended the funding of
the head injury experiments at the University of Pennsylvania and or-
dered the University to review all of its laboratories and open them to
federal investigators 6 does not indicate that the regulatory process is
working. It is encouraging that the N.I.H. took these steps, but it did so
well over a year after the laboratory tapes were stolen and publicized.
7
During this time, the tests continued. If the treatment of laboratory
animals is to be improved under current laws, an alternative to federal
regulation is needed.
some tie-breaking neutral members." Singer, supra note 5, at 48.
The Department of Health and Human Services requires that research facili-
ties receiving federal funding have an animal care committee that includes a veterinar-
ian. See 41 C.F.R. § 3-4.5804(a)(2) (1984). Despite hopes that a veterinarian may be
more sensitive to the needs of animals, veterinarians as a whole go through much the
same training process as other researchers and, thus, may not be any more attentive to
the needs of animals. See P. SINGER, supra note 3, at 74-76. As long as the sole protec-
tion for animals is in the hands of the scientific community, one cannot hope for real
improvement in the care of animals.
Currently, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have bills before
them that would require the animal care committee to include at least one individual
not associated with the research facility. See H.R. 2409, supra note 30, at § 493(b); S.
1309, supra note 30, at § 493(b). Although this change in the composition of animal
care committees might improve their effectiveness to some extent, there are reasons to
be skeptical. First, there is no requirement that the committee include a lay person.
Second, the role of the committee is limited to "evaluat[ing] compliance with applicable
guidelines established under [the previous subsection of the bill] for appropriate animal
care and treatment." Id. § 493(b)(3)(A); see also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text (discussing standards of care under existing and proposed legislation). Finally, the
committees have no power to disapprove proposed research; rather, their role is limited
to "report[ing] violations of NIH guidelines first to their institutions and, if a violation
continues, then to NIH." H.R. REP. No. 158, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1985). Ani-
mals will have to be subjected to violations of the guidelines before any attempt can be
made to stop the experimentation. A far preferable approach is the one adopted by
Sweden. See supra note 62.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
68 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1985, at A7, col. 4.
17 The tapes were stolen on Memorial Day, 1984. See Robbins, supra note 3, at
Al, col. 3.
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B. Intervention by the States in the Treatment
of Laboratory Animals
1. The Use of State Anticruelty Statutes
State anticruelty statutes embody the public consensus that persons
have duties to animals.6 The common-law position that animals were
property and "could be exploited, used, abused, or dispatched at [the
owner's] pleasure"69 has been rejected in favor of defining acceptable
levels of care, applicable to the owner as well as others. In most states,
the infliction of unnecessary or unjustified pain on animals is a viola-
tion of the state anticruelty statute.70 That there may be some benefit to
humans from a particular experiment should not preclude insisting that
scientists adhere to these statutory limits in their use of laboratory
animals.
Advocacy of the application of state anticruelty laws does not re-
quire that all scientific experimentation involving animals cease.
Rather, it requires that such experimentation be justifiable to the pub-
lic. 7 1 The fear that the courts will become entwined in a scientific in-
quiry in which they lack the expertise to adjudicate the issue should not
prevent courts from hearing these cases. In cases in which the issue
revolves around the quality of the experiment-whether the research
project is properly designed7 2-courts can avail themselves of the pleth-
ora of expert witnesses that both sides will undoubtedly call forth. In
other cases, even if a proper design has been established, the issue will
be whether the pain inflicted upon the animals is justifiable in terms of
the asserted benefits to humans." This is largely a moral issue, and
88 See Burr, supra note 9, at 229.
6 See Friend, Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform, 8 RICHMOND L. REV.
201, 201 (1974).
70 See id. at 205; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984)
(directed at anyone who "inflicts unnecessary cruelty"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1325(a)(2) (1974 & Supp. 1984) ("unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suf-
fering"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511 (1982). For a review of the law in all 50 states,
see D. MORETTI, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1984).
71 See Leavitt & Halverson, The Evolution of Anti-Cruelty Laws in the United
States, in ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 20-27 (reviewing
qualifying language in state anticruelty laws); see also 3A C.J.S. Animals § 101 (1973)
("The test of whether the injury inflicted constitutes that cruelty forbidden by statute is
whether the injury inflicted on the animal was, under the circumstances, justifiable.").
72 An experiment is improperly designed if errors in technique necessarily pre-
clude the achievement of valid results. The defects in the planning and administration
of the head injury tests at the University of Pennsylvania illustrate how an improperly
designed experiment can invalidate results and cause pain to animals without any pos-
sible benefit to any person. For a discussion of the defects in these tests, see supra notes
34-35 and accompanying text.
71 Some have argued that no amount of benefit for humans can justify experimen-
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there is no reason why courts should not be as competent as scientists to
evaluate the duty that society owes to animals. Most jurisdictions have
either legislative or judicial standards concerning animal cruelty. 4
Courts will not be striking out on their own, but enforcing duties that
now exist in many states.
A number of states, however, have specifically exempted scientific
research from the standards of their anticruelty statutes,7 5 thus preclud-
ing court action against inhumane experimentation until the legisla-
tures act.7 6 In jurisdictions in which the statutes do not specifically ex-
empt research, however, there is reason to believe that courts will be
willing to entertain prosecutions against researchers. As stated earlier,
in Taub v. State the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Mary-
land's anticruelty statute did not apply to federally funded research
projects. 7 Less than a year later the state legislature amended the law
to make it clear that the prohibitions did extend to all experiments in-
volving animals.7 The increasing awareness of the need to protect ani-
mals, coupled with the state legislature's reversal of the highest Mary-
land court, may convince state courts that the silence in the anticruelty
statutes implies that experimentation is covered rather than exempted.
2. Concerns with the Application of Anticruelty Statutes
A number of animal rights advocates have cautioned against levy-
ing the charge of cruelty against individual scientists. As one commen-
tation on animals of a different species. See T. REGAN, supra note 3, at 314, 397.
71 See, e.g., People v. Arcidicono, 75 Misc. 2d 294, 296, 347 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853
(Dist. Ct. 1973) (statute requires culpable intent), affd, 79 Misc. 2d 242, 360
N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Term. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 77 (West 1980)
("unnecessary cruelty"). A number of commentators have also suggested standards to
judge research on animals. See Goldman, supra note 39, at 191 (Experimentation on
animals that causes pain and suffering is justified if it has "a direct benefit, a good and
immediately relevant reason-one which most people would accept as adequate.");
Kerr, The Investigator's Responsibilities in Research Involving Animals, in SCIEN-
TIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMAL WELFARE 19, 25 (1982) (Painful experimentation is
justified where the "investigator not only is willing to, but actually has tested the pain-
ful stimulus he plans to employ, and will not subject an animal to pain which he
cannot readily tolerate himself.").
75 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325(b) (1974 & Supp. 1984); cf. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 710 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1985) (exempting institutions
operating under a federal license).
78 Not all of the scientific exemptions are absolute. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 403(c)(2) (1974) (scientific research exempt if done by "competent" researchers
"in a humane manner with a minimum suffering to the animals").
See Taub, 296 Md. at 444, 463 A.2d at 822.
78 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (Supp. 1985) ("It is the intention of the
General Assembly that all animals . . . under private, local, State, or federally funded
scientific or medical activities . . . shall be protected from intentional cruelty.").
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tator noted, the label of cruelty "conjures up images of crazed sadists"
and may serve to intensify the conflict between the scientific community
and animal rights groups rather than increase cooperation between
them. 9 Bringing an individual up on charges may also be seen as inap-
propriate because the problem is more an institutional one than an in-
dividual one."' To the extent that the current situation is viewed as a
systemic lack of consideration of animals' interests, one may be reluc-
tant to impose fault on scientists as individuals. Moreover, judges and
juries may be reluctant to convict a respected scientist. Concern for the
interest of laboratory animals is a relatively recent development, and
animal anticruelty statutes have not been applied to scientific experi-
mentation in most jurisdictions. It may be unfair to give a defendant a
criminal record for actions in an area in which public standards are
changing so rapidly.8'
Although these objections to a cruelty label are powerful, the bene-
fits to be derived from the use of the state statutes outweigh the poten-
tial problems. Scientists should be held to the standards that the legisla-
tures have imposed on the rest of society. The failure to do so has
resulted in the lack of any voice for animals behind the laboratory door
and has prevented "a moral evaluation of experimental techniques by
any parties but the scientists themselves." 2 Finally, although individual
scientists are not sadists, it can hardly be doubted that some of the ex-
periments are cruel if cruelty is defined as "behavior that inflicts un-
necessary pain or torment."'83 Failure to recognize this may perpetuate
the disregarding of animal interests until the scientific community
agrees to change.
A far greater concern with reliance on the state anticruelty statutes
7' See T. REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN: ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL ETHICS 62 (1982).
80 See P. SINGER, supra note 3, at 35-36.
81 See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1017-18
(1965).
82 See Burr, supra note 9, at 222-23.
83 Feinberg, Human Duties and Animal Rights, in ON THE FIFTH DAY:
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN ETHICS 45, 60 (1978). A different view of cruelty is
presented by philosopher Tom Regan. Regan contends that cruelty necessarily refers to
one's mental state, and thus to be cruel one must either be sadistic or indifferent to
pain. See T. REGAN, supra note 79, at 67. Under this definition of cruelty, one might
hesitate a great deal before applying the anticruelty statutes. If, however, cruelty is
defined in terms of the act rather than the actor, there may be less reason to hesitate. It
is interesting to note that many of the states have adopted Regan's view of cruelty by
requiring a culpable state of mind in order to sustain a conviction under the anticruelty
statutes. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. In Wisconsin the legislature recently
eliminated the intent requirement, indicating a possible change in the states' definition
of cruelty; "bona fide" research, however, is not covered by the Wisconsin statute. WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 948.02 (West 1982).
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than a reluctance to label scientists cruel is the difficulty of establishing
criminal intent on the part of the researchers. As is true with any crime
that is not a strict liability offense, state courts will read in a require-
ment of criminal intent even if the statute does not explicitly require a
culpable state of mind.' 4 The insistence on a showing of criminal intent
greatly limits the potential effectiveness of these statutes.s5 As the pros-
ecution of Dr. Taub illustrates, however, it is possible to obtain a con-
viction under these statutes. Although the application of anticruelty
statutes cannot realistically be expected to stop all questionable experi-
mentation, it will at least move the law in the direction of protecting
animals' interests.
Criminal sanctions, however, may not serve adequately to protect
laboratory animals. Criminal laws come into play only after the ani-
mals have been abused. In addition, the focus of criminal statutes is on
an individual's intent and not the institutional nature of much of the
abuse. Injunctive relief that would prevent the mistreatment of animals
is therefore often preferable to the levying of criminal penalties for vio-
lations of the statutes.
II. EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE ANTICRUELTY STATUTES
UNDER A PUBLIC NUISANCE THEORY
It is a well-established rule that courts will enjoin the violation of
a criminal statute if the criminal activity also constitutes a public nui-
sance.86 Where a state statute or municipal ordinance explicitly pro-
vides that violations are considered public nuisances, courts have exer-
cised their equitable powers and issued injunctive relief.8" The
"' See People v. Olary, 10 Mich. App. 640, 642-43, 160 N.W.2d 348, 349 (1968)
(willfulness shown), affd, 382 Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Brook-
shire, 355 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (criminal intent an "essential ele-
ment"); State v. Hafle, 52 Ohio App. 2d 9, 14, 367 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (1977) (reck-
lessness required). But see State v. Vance, 119 Vt. 268, 274, 125 A.2d 800, 803 (1956)
(If the legislature intended to make intent a requirement, it would have said so.).
s See Dichter, supra note 8, at 159.
See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 877-78, 118 P.2d 472, 475 (1941) ("Where
particular activity . . . has been held to come within the language of a statute defining
the term 'public nuisance' for the purposes of equity jurisdiction on behalf of the state,
courts have granted injunctions . . . even though the acts were also criminal."); Evans
Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 382, 180 S.E.2d 712, 716 (enjoining film that
violated criminal obscenity law as a public nuisance), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); Benton v. Kernan, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 459-60, 13 A.2d 825, 838 (Ch. 1940)
("[W]hile it is true that equity will not enforce the penal laws of the state . . . it will
act when the act sought to be enjoined is a nuisance."); see also Developments in the
Law-Injunctions, supra note 81, at 1013-16 (explaining that since the 18th century
public nuisances have constituted an exception to the rule that equity will not enjoin a
crime).
87 See, e.g., Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 703-05,
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difficulty in obtaining an injunction against criminal activity arises
when the criminal statute does not include such a statement, as is the
case with state anticruelty statutes. Whether the court will be willing to
enjoin the activity will depend on whether it finds either statutory or
common-law support for the claim that the activity is a public
nuisance. 8
This part of the Comment argues that research that violates an-
ticruelty statutes is a public nuisance, and that courts therefore may
enjoin these experiments despite the fact that the activity is also a crim-
inal offense. In the first section, it is shown that inhumane experiments
come within the doctrinal rubric of public nuisance. The second section
responds to concerns that courts have raised about inferring a public
nuisance from a criminal statute. Finally, it is argued that legal reme-
dies are inadequate to meet the problem of abusive research and that
equitable relief is necessary to provide a complete solution.
A. Violations of Anticruelty Statutes and the
Public Nuisance Doctrine
Public nuisances are a group of low-level crimes that interfere
with some right or interest common to the public.8" They include those
actions that "offend public morals, interfere with use by the public of a
public place or endanger or injure the property, health, safety or com-
fort of a considerable number of persons."90 That the legislature has
proscribed the activity may serve as an indication that the activity is
prejudicial to the public interest and threatens the requisite "[i]njury to
the public."'"
At common law, activity violative of public morality was a public
29 N.W.2d 297, 302-03 (1947) (enjoining the violation of a municipal zoning ordi-
nance), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 851 (1948); Napro Dev. Corp. v. Town of Berlin,
135 Vt. 353, 359-60, 376 A.2d 342, 347 (1977) (refusing to enjoin operation of an
adult bookstore because neither statutory nor common law provided that the activity
was a public nuisance).
88 See People ex rel. Kerner v. Huls, 355 Ill. 412, 416-17, 189 N.E. 346, 348-49
(1934) (enjoining refusal to submit cattle to tuberculosis test because cattle infected
with dangerous diseases are a common-law public nuisance); Commissioner of Dep't of
Bldgs. v. Sidne Enters., 90 Misc. 2d 386, 389, 394 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(enjoining lewd exhibitions as a common-law nuisance); Commonwealth v. Barnes &
Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 414, 319 A.2d 871, 883 (1974) (Polluting a stream can be
enjoined as a public nuisance on either statutory or common-law grounds.).
89 See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, .52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1000
(1966).
90 Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968,
971, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (1977) (citation omitted).
91 See Pennsylvania Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo En-
ters., 428 Pa. 350, 360, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968).
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nuisance.92 Courts may find that a public nuisance exists if the action
in question is shown to be "offensive to a community's moral sensibili-
ties."9 The broad public nuisance rubric has been held to encompass
such activities as the operation of a gambling house,94 the showing of
an obscene movie, 95 the running of a massage parlor,96 and the mainte-
nance of a nude dancing establishment.
9 7
A strong case can be made for considering violations of state an-
ticruelty statutes public morality public nuisances. One, if not the ma-
jor, reason for originally enacting these statutes was to protect the
morals of the community.98 Reliance on this historical rationale, how-
ever, will not in itself suffice to show that abusive research is a public
nuisance, since "there can be little doubt now . . . that the directly
intended beneficiaries of animal protection statutes are the protected
animals themselves." 99 Evidence of the current morality of the Ameri-
can public is needed.
As Senator Dole recently stated, "[T]he public's concern is that we
can do a better job in caring for the animals we experiment with and
minimizing their pain and distress . . . -loo Senator Dole's observa-
tion is supported by a number of examples of the public's strong reac-
tion to inhumane and unnecessary experimentation. When the plan to
shoot dogs for the training of doctors was leaked to the press, "calls of
protest poured in to the offices of [Representative] Lantos and other
members of Congress."' 10 Exposure of the head injury tests at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania provoked a stream of letters to local papers pro-
92 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment b (1977).
93 People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 51, 550 P.2d
600, 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 333 (Adult bookstores and obscene movies may be en-
joined on the grounds that they are public nuisances.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
" See Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 389, 114 P.2d 236, 239 (1941).
95 See Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 382, 180 S.E.2d 712, 716,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
96 See Village of Bensenville v. Botu, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 634, 635, 350 N.E.2d
239, 241 (1976).
17 See Commissioner of Dep't of Bldgs. v. Sidne Enters., 90 Misc. 2d 386, 391-92,
94 N.Y.S.2d 777, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
98 See Commonwealth v. Higgins, 277 Mass. 191, 194, 178 N.E. 536, 538 (1931)
(interpreting a state anticruelty statute as directed against "acts which may be thought
to have a tendency to dull humanitarian feelings and to corrupt the morals of those who
observe or have knowledge of those acts"); see also Feinberg, supra note 83, at 48
(1978).
91 Feinberg, supra note 83, at 48.
10 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals, supra note 40, at 2 (statement
of Senator Robert Dole, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry).
101 Weinberger Halts School's Plan to Shoot Dogs, supra note 13, at Cl, col. 2.
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testing the research. 0 2 Finally, the publicity surrounding Dr. Taub's
treatment of animals led to congressional hearings on Capitol Hill.103
In light of the public's negative reaction to abusive research, there
should be little doubt that such research is offensive to our sensibilities.
Labeling research a public nuisance may be objected to on the
grounds that actions normally considered public morality nuisances,
such as lewd dancing, serve little or no social purpose. Scientific re-
search, on the other hand, is generally conceded to serve society, and to
consider it in the same vein as these other activities ignores this impor-
tant distinction. This objection assumes that because some research is
valuable to Society, all scientific experimentation should be viewed as
beneficial. When research is shown to violate anticruelty statutes, how-
ever, it is difficult to understand why it should not be treated as an
offense to public morality. Cruel and unnecessary research on animals
offends the public's sense of decency, and the fact that other experi-
ments are acceptable should not preclude courts from acting against
experiments that are not.
Once it is shown that an activity is offensive to public morality,
courts have often required some further showing of interference with
the public's interest in order to. sustain a public nuisance action.", One
result of this requirement is that some jurisdictions have interpreted
public nuisances to apply only to activities occurring in a public place,
where the public may come into contact with the offensive activity. 5
Most jurisdictions, however, have not held to a literal meaning of inter-
ference with the public, permitting actions to be brought against adult
bookstores, massage parlors, and obscene movies.1 6 Although these
cases involve the public to the extent that the objects of the injunctions
are commercial enterprises, there are cases in which the courts have not
10I See, e.g., Letters to the Editor: Only Extra-Legal Action Stopped Penn, Phila-
delphia Inquirer, July 28, 1985, at 6-C, col. 3; Letters to the Editor: Responsible Probe
Needed at Penn Lab, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 8, 1985, at 8-A, col. 3; Letters to the
Editor: Higher Laws, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1984, at 22-A, col. 3.
"' See Hearings on Medical Research, supra note 47; Humane Care for Ani-
mals in Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
'0 See Prosser, supra note 89, at 1001.
105 See State v. Rocker, 52 Hawaii 336, 339, 475 P.2d 684, 687 (1970) (A public
nuisance must occur in a public place where it may be seen by others.); Napro Dev.
Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 135 Vt. 353, 358, 376 A.2d 342, 347 (1977) ("[Tlhe concept
of public nuisance is intended only to govern conduct thrust upon those who find it
repugnant.").
106 See, e.g., People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 51,
550 P.2d 600, 605, 130 'Cal. Rptr. 328, 333 ("The fact that obscene or other indecent
exhibitions take place behind closed doors and are viewed only by those who choose to
view them does not defeat the community's interest in regulating such exhibitions."),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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required that the public have access to the place in which the activity
occurs. 107 In these jurisdictions, it is sufficient that persons know of the
activity for it to constitute a public morality public nuisance.
Given the willingness of many courts to enjoin offensive conduct, it
is difficult to conclude that they strictly adhere to the requirement of a
showing of interference with the public. The vast amount of public
funding received by research institutions should be sufficient to provide
a nexus between the public and the experiment for purposes of a public
nuisance action. The public contact requirement, therefore, should not
be a stumbling block in efforts to obtain an injunction against inhu-
mane experimentation.
A related doctrinal requirement for maintaining a public nuisance
action is a showing that the public is threatened with harm from the
activity.'0 8 Massage parlors and adult bookstores can be seen as threat-
ening the quality of a neighborhood and attracting criminals.' 0 9 Re-
search violating anticruelty statutes does not pose this type of threat to
property interests, but to the extent that courts are willing to view the'
harm in terms of the injury to our sense of decency, the harm to the
public should be treated in the same way whether the activity is lewd
dancing or abusive experimentation. Some state courts, moreover, have
been willing to presume that the public is harmed by activities that the
legislature has proscribed. 110 This approach was taken by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court when it stated that a bullfight could be enjoined
as a public nuisance because it violated the anticruelty statute and was
therefore prejudicial to the public.""'
It thus appears that abusive research on laboratory animals can
come under the doctrinal rubric of public nuisance law. Yet courts have
shown reluctance to label criminal activities public nuisances. It is to
these concerns that the Comment will now turn.
101 See Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 389-90, 114 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1941) (Nui-
sances affecting public morals can be enjoined without a showing of interference with
the public.); Adams v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 76, 80, 171 S.W. 1006, 1007 (1915)
(finding sufficient in a public nuisance prosecution for cohabitation that the community
knew that the unmarried parties were living together).
108 See Prosser, supra note 89, at 1004.
lo9 See Comment, Can an Adult Theater or Bookstore Be Abated as a Public
Nuisance in California?, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 115, 121-24 (1975).
110 See Attorney Gen. ex rel. Optometry Bd. of Examiners v. Peterson, 381 Mich.
445, 465, 164 N.W.2d 43, 53 (1969) ("Harm to the public is presumed to flow from
the violation of a valid statute enacted to preserve public health, safety and welfare.");
Pennsylvania Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters., 428 Pa. 350,
360, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968) (violation of the legislature's proscription is prejudicial
to the public interest).
11 See Pennsylvania Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters.,
428 Pa. 350, 360, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968).
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B. The Relationship Between Public Nuisance Law and State
Criminal Statutes
There is a tension between public nuisance doctrine and the devel-
opment of a codified criminal law. Although public nuisances have tra-
ditionally been both torts and crimes,"1 2 it is clear that not all crimes
are public nuisances. For example, no one would doubt that it is in the
public interest to prohibit murders. At the same time, it seems ludicrous
to suggest that homicide is a public nuisance. One reason for this is that
we know public nuisances include only low-level crimes, but this an-
swer does not resolve the problem of when it is justifiable for the courts
to treat an activity proscribed by the legislature as a public nuisance.
One reason state courts have been reluctant to infer that a criminal
activity also constitutes a public nuisance is that defendants will be de-
prived of rights they would have in a criminal action." 3 Criminal trials
provide the defendant with the possibility of a jury trial and a standard
of proof higher than that applied in an action at equity. 4 To refuse to
label an activity a public nuisance on this basis, however, misinterprets
the reasons for making the activity criminal. This position assumes that
at least one reason for the legislature's decision to make an activity
criminal was to afford the defendant the protections of a criminal
trial. 15 It is doubtful that the legislature had this in mind. Rather, one
can assume that the purpose was to deter the activity with the threat of
punishment. Because the researcher will not be stigmatized by the state
with a criminal conviction when an experiment is enjoined,116 the fact
that the researcher could also be criminally prosecuted should not pre-
vent the courts from labeling the activity a public nuisance.
Another concern with using public nuisance doctrine to enjoin ac-
tivities proscribed by the criminal law is that it disrupts the enforce-
ment mechanism chosen by the legislature. 1 This concern has led
some courts to hold that when a criminal penalty is provided, it is the
exclusive remedy. 1 8 There are, however, a number of cases in the pub-
112 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment b (1977).
11 See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941). Although
the court in Lim held that a gambling house could be enjoined as a public nuisance, it
expressed its concern that "the equitable remedy has the collateral effect of depriving a
defendant of the jury trial to which he would be entitled in a criminal prosecution for
violating exactly the same standards of public policy." Id.
114 See id.
115 See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 81, at 1019.
.18 Although an injunction may exact a high price, it is not generally seen as a
state punishment. Hence, there is not the need for the safeguards that exist in a crimi-
nal trial.
117 See People v. Vandewater, 250 N.Y. 83, 91, 164 N.E. 864, 866-67 (1928).
118 See, e.g., Southland Theaters, Inc. v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 192, 193,
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lic nuisance area and elsewhere in which such a restrictive reading of
criminal statutes has been rejected. State courts have been willing to
exercise their equitable powers when the criminal statute imposes a
duty for the benefit of others'19 or when it is in the public interest to do
so." 0 If the use of an injunction furthers the goals of the legislation,
state courts should be willing to exercise their traditional equitable
powers to enjoin a public nuisance.
When it can be established that an activity meets the doctrinal
requirements of a public nuisance action, there seem to be few reasons
for the courts to be concerned about interfering with the legislature's
prerogatives. Moreover, most jurisdictions appear to recognize this;
they are willing to apply the public nuisance doctrine in situations in
which they can find implicit support-either common law or statu-
tory-for labeling the activity a public nuisance."2' If it can be shown
492 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1973) (refusing to enjoin showing of obscene films because the,
obscenity statute provided only criminal sanctions).
The possibility of courts interpreting the criminal penalties as the exclusive rem-
edy is also implicated by the movement away from amorphous criminal public nuisance
statutes to more specific statutes. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 practice commentary
(McKinney 1980) (noting that the purpose of the revision of the criminal nuisance
statute is "to restrict the offense to its generic scope by limiting the kinds of [places]
prohibited to those where persons gather for purposes of 'engaging in' unlawful con-
duct"). This trend may lead to an increased reluctance on the part of the courts to
consider an activity a public nuisance. See Napro Dev. Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 135
Vt. 353, 358-59, 376 A.2d 342, 347-48 (1977) (refusing to enjoin adult bookstore).
Other courts, however, by continuing to employ more traditional definitions, have im-
plicitly refused to consider these statutes as limiting the activities that come within the
public nuisance rubric. See Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spritzer v. Linder, 59
N.Y.2d 314, 335, 451 N.E.2d 459, 468, 59 N.Y.S.2d 712, 721 (1983) ("[Tihe allega-
tion of substantial interference with the common rights of the public at large is a suffi-
cient predicate for a private action based on public nuisance.").
Most states, however, continue to give a broad definition to public nuisances. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment c (1977); see also, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1970) (defining public nuisance as "[a]nything which is
injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or prop-
erty"). Thus, the fact that violations of state anticruelty laws are not specifically labeled
public nuisances should not prevent the courts from issuing injunctive relief against
unlawful scientific experiments.
119 See, e.g., Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 127-30, 110 A.2d 383, 385-86
(1955) (enjoining the operation of a racially restrictive park because it violated the state
public accommodations statute).
120 See Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 382, 180 S.E.2d 712, 716
(Activities that threaten the public welfare may be enjoined as public nuisances even if
they are punishable under a criminal statute.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); At-
torney Gen. ex rel. Optometry Bd. of Examiners v. Peterson, 381 Mich. 445, 466, 164
N.W.2d 43, 53 (1969) ("The existence of a criminal or other penalty for the practice of
a profession without a license will not oust equity from jurisdiction.") (citations
omitted).
121 See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 458-59, 347 A.2d 290, 303
(1975) ("A thing may be a public nuisance because it is so declared by statute, either
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that* a criminal prosecution is an inadequate response to experiments
that violate anticruelty statutes, courts should be willing to enjoin the
research as a public nuisance.
C. The Inadequacy of Legal Remedies
Although to obtain equitable relief it is generally necessary to
prove that legal remedies are inadequate, courts tend to assume that
this is true in a public nuisance action involving a public morality of-
fense. It seems likely, however, that courts will insist on a showing of
inadequate legal remedies in an attempt to obtain an injunction against
a scientific experiment. The typical public morality public nuisance ac-
tion involves the operation of an illegal enterprise, and the courts pre-
sume either that there will be too few arrests or that the fines will be
too low to discourage the owner from operating the business.1 22 In an
action against a research facility, on the other hand, only a specific
experiment within the institution, not the institutional activity itself, is
criminal.
The adequacy of legal remedies may be a difficult argument to
overcome in light of Dr. Taub's prosecution.123 That the criminal pros-
ecution ended the abuse of animals in that case, however, does not
mean that legal remedies will provide adequate relief in all cases.
Courts have held that equitable relief will be granted if the plaintiff
can show that it will be more effective than the available legal
remedy.
124
There are strong reasons to prefer equitable relief in an action
explicitly or implicitly. Alternatively, it may be declared a nuisance as a matter of
common law if, though not prohibited by statute, it unreasonably interferes with the
rights of the public.") (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); cf. People
v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 882, 118 P.2d 472, 477 (1941) (A gambling house may be
enjoined as a public nuisance.); Commissioner of Dep't of Bldgs. v. Sidne Enters., 90
Misc. 2d 386, 391-92, 394 N.Y.S.2d 777, 781-82 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding lewd danc-
ing in violation of obscenity statute a public nuisance).
122 See, e.g., Commissioner of Dep't of Bldgs. v. Sidne Enters., 90 Misc. 2d 386,
392, 394 N.Y.S.2d 777, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The presumption that legal remedies will
not be an adequate solution has led courts to state that the existence of legal remedies is
"irrelevant" to the question of equitable relief. See Village of Bensenville v. Botu, Inc.,
39 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636, 350 N.E.2d 239, 242 (1976).
123 When the police raided Taub's laboratory, all of the monkeys were seized,
ending the experiments on them. See Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
Moreover, his grant from the N.I.H. was revoked within one month of the raid. See
HHS Sanction Against Researcher Upheld, Washington Post, June 16, 1984, at B3,
col. 4.
124 See Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 705, 29
N.W.2d 297, 302 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 851 (1948); cf. Engle v. Scott, 57
Ariz. 383, 391, 114 P.2d 236, 239 (1941) (stating that the trial judge has discretion to
decide whether injunctive relief is preferable because other remedies are not complete).
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against inhumane experimentation. Because injunctions can be issued
when harm is threatened,' 25 they can be used prior to the commence-
ment of an experiment, whereas a criminal prosecution can take place
only after the abuse has occurred. If one is forced to wait, living beings
will be irreparably injured. Moreover, injunctive relief can be used to
advance far-reaching solutions. Instead of simply convicting researchers
for violations of the statute, the legal system could encourage them to
work with other scientists and animal groups to develop less painful
methods by which the goals of their experiments could still be achieved.
In relying on the substance of the anticruelty laws in public nui-
sance actions, one is again faced with the problem that these statutes
are notoriously weak. It is likely that some courts will be unwilling to
enjoin an experiment in the face of a scientist's claim that it is neces-
sary for the public's health. In one of the few cases involving animal
research, a New Jersey court rejected the claim that a high school stu-
dent's experiments inducing cancer in live chickens fell within the state.
anticruelty statute because the motives were "purely scientific and edu-
cational. 1 28 According to this court, "[I]f there is a truly useful motive,
a real and valid purpose, there can, under the statute, be acts done to
animals which are ostensibly cruel, or which ostensibly cause pain."' 27
The reluctance of some state courts to give adequate attention to the
interests of animals should not, however, deter the institution of these
actions. It can be hoped that the recent publicity on abusive research
will encourage courts to insist on more proof that the research is justi-
fied than merely that the motives were scientific.
Although abusive research falls within the public nuisance doc-
trine, recognition of this alone may do little to protect laboratory ani-
mals. Public authorities have been reluctant to enforce the criminal
statutes,22 and there is little reason to expect that they will be any
more enthusiastic about bringing public nuisance actions in this area.
Without a more liberalized approach to the standing requirement in
public nuisance actions, recognizing violations of anticruelty statutes as
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment i (1977).
12' New Jersey Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Educ., 91
N.J. Super. 81, 94, 219 A.2d 200, 208 (Essex County Ct. 1966), affd per curiam, 49
N.J. 15, 227 A.2d 506 (1967).
127 Id. at 92, 219 A.2d at 206 (footnotes omitted).
1 8 See Friend, supra note 69, at 217. The lack of enforcement of state anticruelty
statutes by state authorities is understandable. The offenses are usually misdemeanors,
and when local prosecutors are faced with limited resources, it stands to reason that
they would choose to focus their energies on crimes in which people are seriously in-
jured or killed.
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public nuisances cannot be expected to alleviate the conditions suffered
by laboratory animals.
III. GRANTING ANIMAL WELFARE GROUPS ACCESS TO THE
COURTS IN PUBLIC NUISANCE ACTIONS
Courts have traditionally limited standing in public nuisance ac-
tions to public authorities and private individuals who can show harm
different from that suffered by the general public."2 9 Private individuals
have thus been barred from bringing nuisance actions based on the in-
fringement of public morals.1 30 The standing requirement in this area
of the law can be understood in part as an outgrowth of the origins of
the public nuisance action. In its early stages, the public nuisance ac-
tion was seen as an action to protect the rights of the King, and only
persons appointed by him were authorized to represent him in court.
Continued adherence to the rule has been justified on the grounds that
only public officials have the authority to speak for the general
public."'
Practical considerations have also played a role in the vitality of
the rule. Permitting private persons to bring these actions has been seen
as threatening "utter chaos" in the courts.13 2 Moreover, some commen-
tators have assumed that the harm to individuals from public nuisances
is usually trivial and that the standing requirement prevents the harass-
ment of defendants by overly sensitive individuals.1 3
This part of the Comment argues that the considerations support-
ing restrictive standing requirements should not prevent state courts
from granting standing to animal rights groups in actions against unac-
ceptable research on laboratory animals. In states where SPCA's have
the authority to prosecute violations of the anticruelty statutes, the soci-
eties may be viewed as coming within the traditional requirements for
standing in public nuisance actions. Because this approach will be suc-
cessful in only a few states, the Comment turns to analogies with other
areas of the law in an attempt to ensure judicial review of questionable
1 9 See, e.g., B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Inv. Co., 451 A.2d 879 (D.C.
1982) (no standing to maintain action for violation of zoning ordinance because plain-
tiff suffered no special damages); Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 5 N.J.
580, 587, 76 A.2d 808, 811 (1950) (no standing to enjoin closing of road without show-
ing special injury); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 821C comment j
(1977).
130 See Parker v. Lowery, 446 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. 1969) (private citizen de-
nied standing in action against a gambling house for injunction and monetary relief).
3I See Prosser, supra note 89, at 1007.
132 See Parker v. Lowery, 446 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo. 1969).
133 See Prosser, supra note 89, at 1007.
422 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
activity in research facilities. A strong argument can be made to treat
SPCA's the same as other professional associations that have been
granted standing to bring actions to protect the public interest. Finally,
the Comment argues that standing requirements in public nuisance ac-
tions should reflect the liberalization of standing in other areas of state
law.
A. Standing in Jurisdictions Where SPCA's Have
Authority to Prosecute
The legislatures in seven states have provided SPCA's and hu-
mane societies 3 with the power to prosecute violations of the an-
ticruelty statutes.13 5 This authority should be sufficient for the courts to
grant the societies standing in a public nuisance action. The state legis-
latures in these jurisdictions have recognized the societies as representa-
tives of the public. The concern, therefore, that a private group might
illegitimately usurp the role of guardian of the public interest does not,
apply.
It is equally unsound to rely on the other considerations justifying
a restrictive standing doctrine in these jurisdictions. The societies were
granted prosecutorial powers at least in part because the legislatures
recognized that traditional law enforcement mechanisms were not suffi-
cient to enforce the statutes.138 If the courts were to ignore this motiva-
tion in deciding whether to grant these same organizations standing in
a public nuisance civil suit, they would be disregarding the legislatures'
decision that the societies must be able to bring suit in order to assure
adequate enforcement of the anticruelty laws.
SPCA's should therefore have little trouble with the standing re-
quirements of public nuisance actions in jurisdictions that grant them
prosecutorial powers. The majority of states, however, do not vest
prosecutorial authority in the humane societies, but rather limit their
134 The terms SPCA and humane society will be used interchangeably in this
Comment to signify the organization recognized in state codes as responsible for animal
care.
135 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 7904 (1974 & Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 129, § 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1985) (Agents can prosecute viola-
tions that occur in specified activities, but research is not included among those activi-
ties.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.55 (West 1968 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 4:22-3 (West 1973); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2931.18 (Page 1982); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 419 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 16.52.040 (1962 &
Supp. 1986).
13. See Pennsylvania Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters.,
428 Pa. 350, 368, 237 A.2d 342, 353 (1968) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (arguing that
one reason for granting the SPCA its powers is the failure of district attorneys to act in
this area).
[Vol. 134:399
ANIMAL RESEARCH
authority to the power to arrest or aid in prosecution.187 In one public
nuisance action based on an anticruelty statute, the power to arrest was
held insufficient to grant standing to the SPCA as a public authority." 8
Thus, the public authority argument will, in all likelihood, be effective
only in a limited number of cases. It is necessary to turn to alternative
means by which the societies can obtain standing.
B. The Analogy with Professional Associations
Many states permit professionals and their associations to bring
actions to enjoin the unlicensed practice of a profession."39 One justifi-
cation offered for recognition of standing in these cases is that profes-
sionals are seeking to protect their property interest in their licenses
137 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2956 (1977) (power to arrest); CAL. NONPROFIT
CORP. CODE § 10404 (West 1977) (power to file complaints and aid in prosecution);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-23 (West 1975 & Supp. 1985) (power to arrest); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 828.03(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985) (power to investigate); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 711-1110 (1976) (power to arrest); IDAHO CODE § 18-2111 (1979)
(power to arrest); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 710 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1985)
(power to investigate complaints); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.605 (1985) (powers of peace
officers for purposes of enforcement of anticruelty statutes); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 3:2391 (West 1973) (police powers granted to agents); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 1212 (1983 & Supp. 1984-1985) (power to arrest granted to agents of animal wel-
fare board, which includes the humane societies); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 63 (1982)
(power to arrest); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 343.01 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985) (power to
enforce law, arrest, make reasonable rules, and investigate or otherwise assist in prose-
cution); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105:18 (1977) (power to arrest); N.Y. NoT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1403(b)(2) (McKinney 1970) (power to file complaints and aid
in prosecution); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(i) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1985)
(power to initiate criminal proceedings); R.I. GEN. LAws § 4-1-21 (1976) (power to
arrest and search); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 40-2-3 (1977) (power to arrest);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-111 (1982) (power to arrest); VA. CODE § 29-213.78 (1985)
(power to arrest); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.16 (West 1982) (power to apply for a search
warrant); Wyo. STAT. § 11-29-107 (1977) (power to arrest). A minority of the states
do not specify the powers of the humane societies. In these jurisdictions, it is reasonable
to assume that they do not possess any special law enforcement powers.
138 See Pennsylvania Soe'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters.,
428 Pa. 350, 362, 237 A.2d 342, 349 (1968).
13 See, e.g., Rush v. City of St. Petersburg, 205 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (action by physician); Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 118-19, 137 N.E.2d 59,
62 (1956) (action by chiropractors to enjoin unlicensed practice); Touchy v. Houston
Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. 1968) (action by lawyers to enjoin violations
of canon of ethics); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41
Wash. 2d 697, 701, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (Wash. 1952) (action to enjoin unlicensed prac-
tice of law). But see Michigan License Beverage Ass'n v. Behnan Hall, Inc., 82 Mich.
App. 319, 326, 266 N.W.2d 808, 810 (1978) (finding that association did not have
standing to bring action for violation of state liquor license code); Nassau Neuropsychi-
atric Soc'y v. Adelphi Univ., 18 N.Y.2d 370, 376, 222 N.E.2d 380, 383, 275 N.Y.S.2d
511, 515 (1966) (finding that society lacked standing to enjoin university's practice of
allowing unlicensed persons to give medical treatment).
1986]
424 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
from unlawful intrusion. 4 ° Under this rationale, permitting associa-
tions to bring suit is justified on the grounds that the associations are
acting to protect their members' interests. 41 One should question, how-
ever, whether the property interest rationale is convincing. Courts that
rely on this justification do not insist on a showing of harm but merely
state that harm is presumed from the existence of the professional
group.142 It seems likely that the reason professionals and their associa-
tions do not have to show harm to maintain the actions is that it would
be very difficult for them to do so. As one state court has acknowledged,
in suits against the unlicensed practice of a profession, "the injury to
the plaintiff's property rights may be so small as to be almost
undetectable.'
1
1
4 3
A more persuasive argument for the recognition of standing in this
area is that the courts see the professionals and their associations as
being in the best position to protect the interests of the public.144 Pro-
fessional organizations such as state bar associations are perceived as
the most likely to discover unlicensed practitioners and, thus, most able
to protect the public from these persons.' 45 In light of the dubious claim
140 See Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 499, 197 S.W.2d 454, 458
(1946) (The license to practice law is a property right that the lawyer can protect
against intrusion.), overruled on other grounds, Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
141 See Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 191 N.J. Super. 426, 431, 467 A.2d
276, 279 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (finding that association had standing to protect
members from fraudulent practices of the defendant), affid, 199 N.J. Super. 363, 489
A.2d 1161 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 99 N.J. 162, 491 A.2d 673 (1984); cf.
Muskegon Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist., 130
Mich. App. 420, 428, 343 N.W.2d 579, 583 (1983) (finding that labor organization
had standing to sue to "protect the rights and interests of its members").
142 See, e.g., Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 118, 137 N.E.2d 59, 62 (1956);
Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 499, 197 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1946), over-
ruled on other grounds, Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d
778 (Ky. 1965).
143 William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 194 n.21,
346 A.2d 269, 282 n.21 (1975); see also Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad
Comm'n, 628 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Tex. Ct. App.) (explaining that in Touchy v. Houston
Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968), an action to enjoin the unlicensed practice
of law, there was "nothing . . . to indicate any actual harm to any plaintiff; instead,
the facts [supported] only what was primarily an abstract harm or an injury to the
plaintiffs' sensibilities"), rev'd on other grounds, 633 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1982).
144 See Herman v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 479, 244 N.E.2d
809, 815 (1969) ("We have enjoined the unauthorized practice of law not primarily for
the protection of attorneys generally, but rather for the protection of the public.") (cita-
tion omitted); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash.
2d 697, 700, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952) (not necessary to show that a pecuniary or
property interest of the plaintiff is harmed because the power of the court to enjoin the
unlicensed practice of law is based on harm to the public).
'" See New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Assocs., 22 N.J.
184, 196, 123 A.2d 498, 504 (1956).
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of harm and the ability of the associations to effect the purposes of the
regulating statutes, it is reasonable to conclude that the motivation for
the granting of standing is the public interest in ensuring that persons
who hold themselves out as doctors and lawyers are properly trained.
In the context of standing, SPCA's should be viewed in the same
light as professional associations. These societies have an expertise in
the area of animal care not generally found in law enforcement agen-
cies. Moreover, they are recognized as responsible for standards of care
provided to animals in much the same way as professional associations
are regarded as guardians of their professions. A possible problem with
this analogy is that some courts may insist on maintaining the fiction of
an infringement of property rights as the basis of an-action against an
unlicensed practice. Granting standing to professional associations can
be justified under this fiction with the rationale that actions brought by
the associations will benefit their members, whereas the humane socie-
ties' members and the direct beneficiaries of their actions are of differ-
ent species. Yet to the extent that the societies' suits and those of the
professional associations are seen as a means to ensure the protection of
the public interest, the two are indistinguishable.14
The analogy to standing granted to professional associations is
problematic because it limits the types of animal welfare groups that
will be able to obtain standing. Although courts may be willing to grant
standing on this basis to well-established groups, it may be difficult to
convince a court that newer animal rights groups should be accorded
the same respect as legal or medical associations. In light of the limited
resources of most established humane societies, 147 they may be unwill-
ing to bring costly civil actions and, hence, may not provide sufficient
protection to laboratory animals.'48 Moreover, courts have expressed
reluctance to expand the number of professional associations that will
be granted standing in these actions149 and, thus, may be unwilling to
146 See supra text accompanying notes 68-74 (Anticruelty statutes protect the
public's decisions on standards of treatment for animals.).
147 See Friend, supra note 69, at 217.
148 A number of animal rights advocates have questioned the willingness of hu-
mane societies to challenge scientists. See P. SINGER, supra note 3, at 241-44. There
have been instances in which persons have held positions in the traditional humane
societies while working with organizations heavily involved in animal research. See
N.Y. Daily News, Conflicts of Interest in Animal Welfare?, May 16, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
Whether or not humane societies will begin to take a more active role in ending abusive
research, it is advisable to provide the opportunity for other animal rights groups to
bring suit in cases in which the societies are reluctant to take action.
149 See Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 191 N.J. Super. 426, 431, 467 A.2d
276, 278 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983), affd, 199 N.J. Super. 363, 489 A.2d 1161
(Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 99 N.J. 162, 491 A.2d 673 (1984). In Feiler the
court refused to extend the holding in New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
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entertain the analogy. An equally plausible argument for standing in
actions against abusive research, however, can be made in terms of the
trend .toward liberal standing rules in cases in which an important pub-
lic issue is at stake.
C. Relying on a Public Interest Argument to Obtain Standing for
Animal Rights Groups
There have been few cases in which animal rights groups have
attempted to bring suit under state anticruelty statutes. In Walz v.
Baum, 150 a New York appellate court held that the plaintiff did not
have sianding to bring a suit against state officials for cruel methods of
animal slaughtering, reasoning that the plaintiff had no personal or
property rights at stake. 51 Five years later the New York Court of
Appeals dismissed an action against New York City officials for injunc-
tive relief against the mistreatment of animals in city zoos because it
did not want to involve the court in questioning the decisions made by
the executive branch of government during a fiscal crisis.1 52 Despite the
court's refusal to hear the case, however, it did note that the Society for
Animal Rights was "probably correct" in asserting that it had stand-
ing. 58 This apparent shift in the New York courts' thinking on the
standing issue can be best understood in terms of some of the recent
developments in the law of standing.
1. The Changing Role of the Courts and the Relaxation of the
Standing Doctrine
State courts are not bound by the case and controversy require-
ment of article III of the Constitution, and some state courts have re-
cently developed a more flexible approach to the issue of standing than
that adopted by their federal counterparts.' This relaxation of stand-
Mortgage Assocs., 22 N.J. 196, 123 A.2d 504 (1956) (granting standing to a bar asso-
ciation using the public interest rationale), to other professional associations. See Feiler,
191 N.J. Super. at 431, 467 A.2d at 278.
42 A.D.2d 643, 345 N.Y.S.2d 159 (App. Div. 1973) (memorandum opinion).
'5' See id. at 644, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
152 See Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408, 380 N.E.2d 277, 280, 408 N.Y.S.2d
449, 452 (1978).
153 Id. at 409, 380 N.E.2d at 280, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
'" See Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 490-91, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (explaining that
the court is not bound by the case and controversy requirement but "remains free to
fashion its own law of standing consistent with notions of substantial justice and sound
judicial administration"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 804 (1980). On the refusal of state
courts to be bound by the federal standing requirements described in Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975), see Stocks v. Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 528, 170 Cal. Rptr.
724, 728 (1981); Home Builders League v. Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 135, 405 A.2d 381,
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ing requirements should be viewed in terms of a changing perception of
the role of the courts. At common law, litigation was perceived as a
means to settle private disputes: the court's role was to serve as an "ad-
junct to [the] private ordering" between autonomous individuals.1 5
Claims of injury to the population at large had little place in a civil
court system that was seen essentially as a private dispute resolution
mechanism. 5 Unless an individual could show that she had a legal
interest that had been encroached upon, she could not invoke the aid of
the courts.1 57 The issue of standing was thus bound to the legal merits
of a case.158 Since legal rights were defined exclusively in terms of the
individual, 59 only an individual who had suffered discrete harm had
standing.
Once the courts began to take into account explicitly the public
interest in their decisions, the nineteenth-century justifications for the
role of the courts became less persuasive. As one commentator has
noted, when a court involves itself in the balancing of public policies,
"the fundamental conception of litigation as a mechanism for private
dispute settlement is no longer viable."160 Rather, the court has taken
on the larger role of furthering public values. In these types of cases,
continued adherence to standing requirements that are based on the
vision of society as secondary to the autonomy of individuals is inconsis-
tent with the changing view of the role of law. This was recently recog-
nized by the Washington Supreme Court, when it held that although
the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the state lottery, the court should hear the case because it involved an
issue "of significant public interest that . . . allow[s] the court to reach
the merits."'' In the area of public nuisance actions, it may be particu-
larly appropriate to recognize that the philosophical underpinnings of
385 (1979).
"I See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1285 (1976). As Chayes explains, the role of the court in the nineteenth
century was a product of a particular "vision of society, which assumed that the major
social and economic arrangements would result from the activities of autonomous indi-
viduals." Id. Courts were to settle disputes that arose from these arrangements and to
clarify the law "to guide future private actions." Id.
158 See id. at 1285-88. Chayes points out that this view of the courts fits well with
a larger view of restricted governmental powers. See id. at 1288.
157 See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 43 (1978).
158 See Chayes, supra note 155, at 1290.
159 See J. VINING, supra note 157, at 43-44. According to Vining, at common law
"there was no conception of illegality as such or, to use a phrase so pejorative in the
law, 'in the abstract,' without regard to the circumstances and claims of a person who
might complain." Id. at 43.
"I Chayes, supra note 155, at 1294-95.
181 Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash. 2d 326, 330, 662 P.2d 821, 824 (1983).
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the standing doctrine have been altered, "since the theory of public nui-
sance is the protection of public rights. 162
This is not to say that the standing doctrine is of no use to the
courts at this point in the development of our legal system. Considera-
tions of the proper role of the judiciary and a desire to avoid- issuing
merely advisory opinions have persuaded the courts to continue to rely
on standing restrictions. 63 Standing can also serve to assure the courts
that the interests of affected parties are properly represented. At the
same time, standing should not be a barrier to judicial review of impor-
tant controversies. The tension between the changing perception of the
courts and the positive role that standing may play in the court system
has led the New Jersey Supreme Court to adopt the position that rec-
ognition of standing is appropriate when the "litigant can show suffi-
cient personal stake so that the Court is not asked to render an advisory
opinion. ' ' 64
Public nuisance actions brought by animal rights groups will not
place the court in the position of rendering advisory opinions. In asking
the court for injunctive relief against a research experiment, the groups
will be providing the court with a specific case to decide. These groups
have shown their dedication to the welfare of animals, and it seems
foolish to doubt that the suits would be sufficiently adversarial. Thus,
actions by these groups would not endanger the salutary goals of the
standing requirement.
Although other state courts have not adopted the position of the
Washington state court by ignoring standing doctrine when important
public issues are involved, they have implicitly recognized the limits of
the standing doctrine by taking into account the public interest in their
decisions on standing.16 5 If a plaintiff in a public interest case can show
I" Bryson & MacBeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 258 (1972).
1"8 See Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquor, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (Fla.
1978) (noting that special damages are still required to establish standing in challenges
to zoning laws, even though "that rule has acquired a more liberal application"); Akau
v. Olohana Corp., 65 Hawaii 383, 388, 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982) (standing granted
in public nuisance action because plaintiff showed injury); In re Biester, 487 Pa. 438,
444, 409 A.2d 848, 851-52 (1979) (refusing to allow private citizen to intervene in
attorney general's request for grand jury on the grounds that the issue was one of
common, not personal, interest); see also Green, The Public Plaintiff Comes to Ne-
braska: An Essay on the Limits of State Judicial Power, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 31,
69 (1979) (discussing requirement of special injury to establish standing for public nui-
sance action).
I" Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137,
144, 417 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1980) (granting standing to hospital to challenge common
law rule that husbands could be held liable for their spouse's medical expenses, but
wives could not).
165 See Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (1980); Boryszew-
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a "slight additional private interest," a state court may be willing to
grant standing."66 The willingness of state courts to recognize nontradi-
tional plaintiffs in public interest actions should result in a liberaliza-
tion of standing requirements in actions to enjoin public nuisances. As
the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, the rea-
sons for restricting standing in public nuisance actions for damages
"are much less applicable to a suit to enjoin the public nuisance and
there are indications of a possible change. Statutes allowing citizens'
actions or authorizing an individual to represent the public, and exten-
sive general developments regarding class actions and standing to sue
are all pertinent.
'167
The devotion of animal rights groups to the welfare of animals
and their efforts to improve the conditions of laboratory animals should
be sufficient to grant them standing under the liberal "additional pri-
vate interest" standard. That suits brought by these groups are moti-
vated by ideological considerations should not prevent the courts from
recognizing that the groups have standing. One of the reasons that
courts are reluctant to grant standing to ideological plaintiffs is that
they are fearful of overloading the courts with trivial concerns.1 68 As
one commentator has noted, however, "It is possible to gauge the
sincerity and strength of a person's commitment to ideological princi-
ples by what he has said or done, and the problem of the insubstantial-
ity of interests must frequently be faced even with material inter-
ests." 169 The Ninth Circuit recently concurred with this approach to
ideologically motivated plaintiffs when it recognized that an animal
rights organization may have standing when it can demonstrate "lon-
gevity and indicia of commitment to preventing inhumane behavior.) 170
Humane societies should have an even stronger argument for the
recognition of standing based on an additional private interest. They
have been recognized by the state legislatures as the groups to be en-
trusted with maintaining humane standards of animal care. It seems
ski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 363-64, 334 N.E.2d 579, 580-81, 72 N.Y.S.2d 623,
625-26 (1975); William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 198,
346 A.2d 269, 284 (1976).
... Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (1980) (challenge to
state tax on out-of-state commuters) (citations omitted); see also Texas Indus. Traffic
League v. Railroad Comm'n, 628 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Tex. Ct. App.) ("[Mlere special
interest" may be sufficient for standing in some circumstances.) (emphasis omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 633 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1982).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C comment j (1977).
188 See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1669, 1738 (1975).
169 Id. (footnotes omitted).
170 Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir.
1985). For a further discussion of this case, see infra note 175.
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particularly appropriate to grant a group standing under the "slight
additional private interest" approach when the legislature has identified
it as having a special interest in an issue. 71
2. Denial of Standing as a Bar to Review
The state courts' reluctance to adhere strictly to standing require-
ments in public interest cases reflects not only a change in the nature of
legal rights, but also the courts' concern that to deny standing "would
be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial review.1
1 72
The departures from traditional standing requirements tend to occur
when there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff before the court
is the only person likely to bring suit, such as when the injury is dif-
fused among the population or when the injured parties are unable to
represent themselves. For example, the National Organization for
Women was granted standing to challenge the use of sex-based employ-
ment advertisements solely because it was a "bona fide and nationally
recognized organization dedicated to eliminating discriminating prac-
tices against women. '17 3 On the other hand, the New York Public In-
terest Research Group was denied standing in an action against a city's
assessment procedures when the members of the community could have
sued under a state statute authorizing taxpayer suits.
1 7 4
Because public authorities have not enforced anticruelty statutes
and animals cannot bring suit under current law, the refusal to recog-
nize standing for animal rights groups will effectively preclude judicial
review of the treatment of laboratory animals. It can, therefore, be con-
vincingly argued that actions against research institutions by these
groups fall within the exceptions to standing recognized elsewhere in
the law. As one court has noted, "Where an act is expressly motivated
by considerations of humaneness towards animals, who are uniquely
incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes us as emi-
nently logical to allow groups specifically concerned with animal wel-
fare to invoke the aid of the courts.
'1 7 5
171 See Pennsylvania Soe'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters.,
428 Pa. 350, 367-69, 237 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1968) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
172 Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581, 372
N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1975).
17' National Org. for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416,
419-20, 314 N.E.2d 867, 869, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127 (1974).
174 See New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Board of Assessment Review,
104 Misc. 2d 128, 131, 427 N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
175 Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Although the court in Kreps based its standing
decision on the construction of a federal environmental statute, it did express its will-
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Some commentators have expressed the concern that if animal
rights groups are granted the power to enforce anticruelty statutes they
will be "overzealous" in their efforts.17 ' This is in all likelihood an
empty concern, given the costs of a nuisance action. Moreover, the al-
ternative is to continue the current lack of enforcement of state an-
ticruelty laws. In light of the absence of attention paid to animal inter-
ests by research institutions, 177 the risk of some overzealousness is a
small price to pay for a change in the present state of affairs.
The traditional reasons for denying standing to private individuals
in actions to enjoin public nuisances should not prevent the courts from
granting standing in actions by animal rights groups against inhumane
experiments. Given the expansion of standing in public interest cases,
the concern that it would be illegitimate for a private group to repre-
sent the public rings hollow. Speculative worries about a deluge of suits
have not prevented the courts from granting standing when the public
interest is involved. Moreover, the fear of chaos in the courts is not
persuasive when some states allow private citizens to bring public nui-
sance actions without a showing of particularized harm.178
Refusal to grant standing will leave laboratory animals unpro-
tected from abuse by researchers. Although one can hope that research
institutions will become more sensitive to the issue of animal rights,
there is a clear need to act to ensure the humane treatment of labora-
tory animals. In light of the great public controversy over the use of
animals in scientific research, courts should not prevent the application
of anticruelty statutes by adhering to rigid standing requirements of
questionable value.
ingness to reach the same conclusion on the basis of the language quoted in the text. See
id. But see National Audubon Soc'y v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (S.D. Tex.
1970) (denying standing in public nuisance action based on threat to whooping cranes
because no special harm shown).
In a recent decision the Ninth Circuit held that the Animal Lovers Volunteer
Association (ALVA) did not have standing to enjoin the Navy from shooting goats on
federal property. See Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937,
938-39 (9th Cir. 1985). The court stated that ALVA had no organizational stake in the
controversy and that its members had no personal stake; the court indicated, however,
that standing might have been granted had ALVA been a better-known organization
with an "indicia of commitment to preventing inhumane behavior." Id. The Fund for
Animals, which had challenged the Navy in a related action, was granted standing
because of its longevity and demonstrated commitment to preventing inhumane behav-
ior. See id. at 939.
178 See Chambers & Hines, Recent Developments Concerning the Use of Animals
in Medical Research, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 123 (1983).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36 & 48-59.
18 See, e.g., State ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to enjoin construction on undevel-
oped island as a public nuisance because statute authorized private suits to abate public
nuisances), cert. denied, 308 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1974).
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CONCLUSION
The cause of action proposed by this Comment raises serious
questions about the direction the law should take in increasing the pro-
tection it offers to animals. In a public nuisance action a court is likely
to evaluate the merits of the case in terms of whether the level of pain
inflicted on animals can be justified by the potential benefit to humans.
Courts are therefore unlikely to halt research on the grounds that it
inflicts an inhumane amount of pain on animals unless there is also
little or no evidence of a benefit to humans.
The public nuisance action is problematic because it is based on
the desire to protect the public's morality and may reinforce the notion
that anticruelty statutes exist to protect human rather than animal in-
terests. 179 Viewing the anticruelty statutes as a statement of public mo-
rality, however, is not inconsistent with recognizing animals as the
principal beneficiaries of these statutes. Moreover, the public nuisance
action may have some political benefits. Court actions by animal rights
groups may serve to mobilize public opinion sufficiently to motivate
legislators to enact laws recognizing legal rights for animals.180 Legal
actions may also encourage the scientific community to be more respon-
sive to animals' interests. Although the theoretical underpinnings of the
public nuisance action are disquieting, the action is one of too few
means to provide some protection for laboratory animals in a system
that denies legal rights to animals.
179 A number of commentators have bemoaned the fact that anticruelty statutes
serve mainly to protect human interests. See Burr, supra note 9, at 213; Dichter, supra
note 8, at 159. The concern is that until statutes are written that protect animals'
interests, animals will not receive protection from the law because their interests will be
subordinate to those of humans. See Dichter, supra note 8, at 160.
'80 For an in-depth proposal of state legislation on this issue, see Burr, supra note
9, at 231-44; see also Comment, supra note 9, at 500-06 (suggesting a guardianship
model for protecting the rights of dogs and cats).
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